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of an employment relationship between a debtor and a creditor is not sufficient to establish
“known creditor” status upon an employee.4
This article examines discusses the requirements of Rule 3003(c) of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”) and the due process concerns the rule
implicates. Part I-A discusses subsection (c)(3) Rule 3003, which generally prohibits the filing of
proofs of claim subsequent to the expiration of a bar date. Part I-B outlines the distinction
between “known creditors” and “unknown creditors” for purposes of providing constitutionally
adequate notice. Part II provides a case study of the Virginia Bankruptcy Court’s ruling in In re
U.S. Airways, a case in which the debtor-employer was a multinational corporation, and where
the court held that because the creditor-employee’s claims were not “reasonably ascertainable,”
the creditor-employee was unknown for notice purposes.5 Part III provides a case study of the
Delaware Bankruptcy Court’s more recent ruling in In re Nortel, a case also involving a
multinational debtor-employee, but where the court held that because the creditor-employees
identities were not reasonably ascertainable the creditor was unknown for notice purposes.6
Finally, Part IV concludes by providing a comparison of the alternate applications of the
reasonably ascertainable standard in In re Nortel and in In re U.S. Airways.
I-A.

Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3) Implicates Due Process Concerns Because it Potentially
Limits Parties’ Opportunities to be Heard.

4

In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 531 B.R. 53, 65 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015) (“The Canadian Employees
were unknown creditors. The Court is satisfied [. . .] that the Published Notice satisfies the
requirements of due process with respect to unknown creditors.”).
5
See In re U.S. Airways, Inc., 2005 WL 3676186, *6 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2005).
6
See In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 531 B.R. at 65.
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Rule 3003(c)(3) authorizes courts to establish a deadline or “bar date” by which proofs of
claim in a bankruptcy case must be filed.7 A failure to file a proof of claim before the bar date
and without sufficient justification may prevent a claimant from receiving a distribution or
otherwise being able to participate in the bankruptcy case.8 The rule was designed to ensure the
“[s]ecuring, within a limited time, the prompt and effectual administration and settlement of the
debtor's estate.”9 The rule also prevents bankruptcy estates from being “[w]asted in profitless
litigation.”10
Setting an outside date after which parties are barred from being able to assert their
claims in court necessarily implicates due process concerns, as “the fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”11 To that end, constitutional due process requires
that notice of a bar date be provided in a manner that is “reasonably calculated to reach all
interested parties, reasonably conveys all the required information, and permits a reasonable time
for a response.”12 Therefore, a creditor who did not receive adequate notice of the bar date is not

7

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c)(3) (“The court shall fix and for cause shown may extend the time
within which proofs of claim or interest may be filed. Notwithstanding the expiration of such
time, a proof of claim may be filed to the extent and under the conditions stated in Rule
3002(c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(6).”).
8
See 11 U.S.C.A § 502 (b)(9) (“the court shall allow such claim . . . except to the extent that
such proof of claim is not timely filed.”).
9
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966).
10
Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 347 (1874).
11
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (2004). See Mullane 339
U.S. at 317 (“[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.”); see also In re Smidth & Co., 413 B.R. 161, 165 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009)
(asserting that all courts must be cognizant of the due process concerns implicated by Rule 3003
(c)(3)).
12
In re Eagle Bus Mfg., Inc., 62 F.3d at 735. See also In re Robintech, 868 F.2d 393, 396 (5th
Cir. 1989) (explaining that due process requires notice that is (1) reasonably calculated to reach
all interested parties; (2) reasonably conveys all of the required information; and (3) permits a
reasonable time for response).
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stopped from filing a tardy proof of claim.13 What constitutes “proper” notice however varies
according to whether the claimant qualifies as either a “known” or an “unknown” creditor.14
I-B.

Courts Distinguish between Known and Unknown Creditors for Purposes of
Establishing Whether Notice Satisfies Due Process Requirements.
For notice purposes, courts have drawn a distinction between known and unknown

creditors.15 In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, the Supreme Court held that state actions
adversely affecting the property rights of individuals must be accompanied by such notice as is
reasonable under the particular circumstances after balancing the state's interests against the due
process interests of individuals.16 Courts have relied on Mullane for purposes of creating the
notice rules because creditors’ claims are considered property interests that are protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution,17 and because a
bankruptcy court’s imposition of a bar date is properly considered a state action.18
Unknown creditors are those “[w]hose ‘interests are either conjectural or future or,
although they could be discovered upon investigation, do not in due course of business come to

13

See In re B.C. Enterprises, Ltd., 160 B.R. 827, 831 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2012) (holding that
creditor did not provide adequate notice, and therefore creditor was therefore not bound by bar
date).
14
Tulsa Prof'l Collection Serv., Inc., 485 U.S at 478 (noting that distinguishing between known
and unknown creditors is necessary to establish whether actual notice to creditors is required by
due process).
15
Id.; see also In re Charter Co., 120 B.R. 650, 654 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
16
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 306.
17
Tulsa Prof’l Collection Serv., Inc., 485 U.S. at 478; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law[.]”).
18
Tulsa Prof’l Collection Serv., Inc., 485 U.S. at 478 (“[t]he court’s activation of a statute’s time
bar . . . is so pervasive and substantial that it must be considered state action.”).
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knowledge [of the debtor].”19 As a result, constructive notice of a bar date, such as notice
published in a newspaper, is sufficient to satisfy due process requirements.20
In contrast, a known creditor is one who is “reasonably ascertainable” by the debtor.21 A
debtor is “reasonably ascertainable” if “reasonably diligent efforts” would reveal their name and
address.22 The “reasonably ascertainable” standard was applied by the Supreme Court in
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, where the Court stated that “[n]otice by mail or other
means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding
which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests ... if [the party's] name and address
are reasonably ascertainable.”23 Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, a known creditor
must be provided with actual notice, that is, notice in fact, of the bar date.24
However, courts have repeatedly recognized the “practical costs and difficulties” that
would necessarily arise if actual notice were to be provided to all possible claimants.25 As a
result, the “reasonably diligent effort” standard does not require debtors to engage in
unreasonable searches for claimants, or to search for and actively encourage all claimants to file

19

Id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317) (finding that notice to beneficiaries whose claims were
“conjectural” or “future” are not necessary to address due process concerns).
20
See Brown, 171 B.R. at 27 (finding that publishing the claims bar date in both national and
international publications satisfied the due process clause); see also In re U.S. Airways, Inc.,
2005 WL 3676186, *6 (finding that defendant employees were not known creditors and
consequently did not require actual notice of the claims bar date in order to satisfy due process
requirements); In re Best Products Co., Inc., 140 B.R. at 353 (holding that notice by publication
satisfied due process requirements).
21
In re Best Products Co., Inc., 140 B.R. at 353 (holding that if creditor was known or
“reasonably ascertainable” by debtor, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that creditor be given
actual notice).
22
Id. at 804; see generally Small Engine Shop, Inc. v. Cascio, 878 F.2d 883, 878 (5th Cir.1989);
In re Sharon Steel Corp., 110 B.R. 205, 206 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.).
23
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 802 (1983).
24
Id.
25
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.
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timely proofs of claim.26 Rather, the search for claimants is limited to a careful examination of
the debtor’s “[o]wn books and records”.27 Only creditors who are identifiable through a diligent
search of these records are “reasonably ascertainable” and hence “known” creditors.28
It may seem that the creditors who satisfy the “reasonably ascertainable” standards may
simply be those creditors whose identities a debtor can ascertain without devoting too many
resources to the search. Therefore, while the reasonable ascertainable standard may exist to
protect debtors from having to engage from an endless and limitless search for potential creditors
and claims,29 the standard may be exploited by debtors seeking to limit the claims of their
creditors.
II.

The Court in In Re U.S. Airways Finds that the “Reasonably Ascertainable”
Standard is an Inquiry as to Whether the Claims of Potential Creditors Are
Reasonably Ascertainable.
In In re U.S. Airways, the court was tasked with deciding whether a creditor-employee

was “reasonably ascertainable” and therefore entitled to actual notice of a bar date.30 In that case,
U.S. Airways and its affiliates (the “debtor-employer”) filed a voluntary petition for relief under
title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).31 The court entered an order
establishing a bar date of February 3, 2005, for non-governmental creditors.32 The court further
ordered the debtor to provide notice to all unknown creditors through publications in national
edition of The New York Times, the national and European editions of The Wall Street Journal,

26

Id.
Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 347 (3rd Cir. 1995).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
See generally In re U.S. Airways, Inc., 2005 WL 3676186 at *1.
31
Id.
32
Id.
27
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and the worldwide edition of USA Today.33 The creditors in this case were a husband and wife,
and the husband was a furloughed employee of the debtor-employer (the “creditor-employee”)
who also owned U.S. Airways stock.34 The creditors did not file proofs of claim until August
2005, nearly six months after the bar date.35 In support of the creditors’ motion seeking leave to
file proofs of claim after the bar date, the creditors asserted that they did not see the bar date in
any publication.36
The court found that the creditor-employee was not a known creditor and consequently
did not require actual notice of the bar date in order to satisfy due process requirements.37 The
court reached this conclusion after applying the “reasonably ascertainable” standard and finding
that the creditors’ claims were not reasonably ascertainable.38 The court reasoned that the
creditor-employee’s cause of action39 was novel and consequently, the debtor was under no
obligation to treat every furloughed employee as a potential creditor based on such an abstract
claim.40 The court noted that “[a] debtor is not constitutionally required to broadly speculate as to
the identity and theory of recovery of each conceivable or possible creditor”41 and that “U.S.

33

Id.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. The creditors did not attach to the motion the claims that he sought leave to file. However,
the court was able to deduce based on statements made at the hearing that the creditors’ claims
were two-fold: the first was a securities fraud claim related to U.S. Airways Group stock the
creditors had purchased at the company's urging. The second was that the creditor-employee was
entitled to lost wages as a furloughed employee because the cancellation of his stock and
furlough were caused by “gross mismanagement that drove a fundamentally viable company into
insolvency.” Id.
37
Id. at *6.
38
Id. at *5.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at *5.
34
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Airways was not required to give notice by mail to those creditors with merely conceivable or
speculative claims.”42 The court found that notice by publication was sufficient.43
III.

The Court in In Re Nortel Finds that the “Reasonably Ascertainable” Standard is an
Inquiry as to Whether the Identities of Potential Creditors Are Reasonably
Ascertainable.
An application of the “reasonable ascertainable” standard to the multinational employer-

employee relationship can also be found in In re Nortel Inc. In that case, the Delaware
bankruptcy court denied a motion filed by former Canadian employees of the debtor Nortel
Networks’ Canadian affiliates (the “Canadian Employees”) seeking leave to file proofs of claim
after the expiration of the bar date.44 On January 14, 2009, the United States Nortel affiliates (the
“U.S. Debtors”) filed voluntary petitions of relief under title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.45 On
the same day, the Canada affiliates (the “Canadian Debtors”) filed insolvency proceedings under
Canada's Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.46
On August 4, 2009, the bankruptcy court entered an order establishing September 30,
2009 as the bar date for filing claims against the U.S. Debtors.47 The U.S. Debtors consequently
served notice of the bar date on all known creditors.48 The U.S. Debtors also published notice of
the bar date in the national and global editions of The Globe, Mail, and The Wall Street
Journal.49 The notice stated that “[a]ll persons and entities ... who have a claim or a potential
claim against the [U.S.] Debtors that arose prior to January 14, 2009 … MUST FILE A PROOF

42

Id.
Id. at *6.
44
In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 531 B.R. at 57.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
43
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OF CLAIM so as to be actually received ... on or before September 30, 2009[.]”50 On August
14, 2009, the Canadian Court recognized the bar date order.51 This “recognition order” was
mailed to the parties representing the interests of the former employees of the Canadian Debtors,
including its legal counsel Koskie Minsky.52 Additionally, notice of the bar date was published
in weekly news bulletins issued by Koskie Minsky to the former employees of the Canadian
Debtors, publicly filed documents in Canada, and posted to a LinkedIn group where former
employees of the Canadian Debtors received information on the insolvency proceedings.53
The Canadian Employees did not timely file proofs of claim against the U.S. Debtors
before the bar date.54 Consequently, they filed a motion with the bankruptcy court seeking leave
to file proofs of claim after the bar date.55 According to the Canadian Employees, they did not
receive actual or constructive notice of the bar date, which amounted to a denial due process.56
The court held that because the Canadian Employees were employed by Nortel Inc.’s Canadian
subsidiaries and did not receive any benefits or have any substantial contact with the U.S. Debtor
they did not qualify as known creditors and therefore were not entitled to actual notice of the bar
date.57 Instead, the court found that the Canadian Employees were unknown creditors who were
entitled to constructive notice.58

50

Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 58.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 59. The Canadian Employees had all been terminated from employment by means of a
termination letter from the Canadian affiliates, which provided that Nortel Networks Corporation
“shall … pay” a severance package to each terminated employee. Id. The Canadian Employees’
proofs of claims sought to compel the severance payments referenced in their termination letters.
Id.
55
Id. at 60.
56
Id. at 62.
57
Id. at 63.
58
Id. at 64.
51
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Conclusion
The In re Nortel decision serves as an important reminder to creditors to be mindful of
public notices and publications pertaining to a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing.59 The decision
made evident that the existence of an employment relationship between a debtor and a creditor
was not sufficient to establish “known creditor” status upon the creditor for the purposes
receiving actual notice of a bar date.60 The holding in In re Nortel is consistent with courts’ well
established recognition of the practical difficulties and expenses of making actual notice
available to all potential creditors.61 In the context of multinational corporations that may
employ thousands of people worldwide, this problem may be exacerbated.
However, In re Nortel may have also expanded the “reasonably ascertainable” standard
beyond previous bounds. In In re U.S. Airways, although the court reached the same holding as
the In re Nortel court, each court’s basis for reaching that holding was critically different. In In
re U.S. Airways, the court noted that “[a] debtor is not constitutionally required to broadly
speculate as to the identity and theory of recovery of each conceivable or possible creditor.”62 By
limiting its analysis to whether the creditor-employee’s theory of recovery was reasonably
ascertainable, the court implied that the identity of the creditor-employee did not require such
“broad speculation” and was reasonably ascertainable to the debtor-employer. Therefore, while
In re U.S. Airways analyzes the substance of creditors’ potential claims, the In re Nortel court

59

In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 531 B.R. at 65 (“The Canadian Employees were unknown
creditors. The Court is satisfied [. . .] that the Published Notice satisfies the requirements of due
process with respect to unknown creditors.”).
60
Id.
61
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.
62
In re U.S. Airways, Inc., 2005 WL 3676186 at *5.
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makes the more incredulous assertion that the large multinational debtor-employer was unable to
ascertain the identities of its own employees.
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